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Memorandum

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

30 April 1965

D I R E C T O R A T E O F I N T E L L I G E N C E

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OCI No. 1211/65
30 April 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM

SUMMARY

Peiping's ultimate goal in Africa is to bring into being Communist regimes under the leadership of pro-Chinese Communist parties. At present and over the short run, however, the Chinese are working to eliminate or weaken pro-Western and pro-Soviet influences and to foster the growth of radical nationalist regimes friendly to Communist China. The Chinese have concentrated their major effort on a comparatively small number of strategic African countries which may be described as the staging areas for wars of "liberation." Independent of the search for close political friends and revolutionary allies, Peiping is continuing the effort to develop diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with as many of the new African states as possible.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

1. The long-range Chinese Communist goal in Africa is to bring into being Communist regimes under the leadership of pro-Chinese Communist parties. At present and over the short run, however, Peiping is working to eliminate or weaken pro-Western, including Chinese Nationalist, and pro-Soviet influences and to foster the growth of radical nationalist regimes friendly to Communist China. The wide range of political views among dissident leaders with whom the Chinese are working illustrates the opportunistic character of their activities.
2. Though the Chinese line in Africa emphasizes revolutionary action, Peiping actually follows a dual strategy. Where it is expedient, the Chinese seek to expand state-to-state relations even with "bourgeois" regimes. Peiping is particularly interested in ties with governments which have, or give promise of having, a satisfactory "anti-imperialist" orientation. In the case of governments which do not meet this test, Peiping generally seeks to work through opposition, dissident, or exile elements either to put pressure on those in power or to overthrow them.
3. Africa is a major theater of competition between the Chinese Communists and the Russians in their struggle for leadership of the underdeveloped world and of the Communist movement. Peiping has constantly suggested, more often by implication than action, that black and yellow peoples have common grievances against the whites, including Russians.
4. Despite the intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute, there are significant similarities between Chinese and Soviet policies in Africa. Both seek to destroy Africa's links with the West and both encourage African countries to identify themselves with the "socialist" camp, by playing upon alleged similarities of historical experience and social aspirations and by portraying international problems as straight conflicts between "progressive" and "neocolonialist" forces.

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5. There is no widespread Communist movement as such in Africa. There are only a handful of Communist parties in Africa and the Chinese have relatively little influence in these parties. As examples, there is a significant pro-Chinese element in the Communist party in Senegal (PAI), and a small pro-Chinese faction in the Sudan Communist Party, while the South African Communist Party is completely dominated by a pro-Soviet group.

6. The absence of sophisticated Communist party organizations and disciplined Communists has forced both Peiping and Moscow to rely on a disparate array of Africans willing to work with them. The Chinese have made liberal use of bribery. They have sought to establish close relations with radical elements in the national mass parties, but there is no evidence yet that they have tried to form Communist cells within these parties. In the short term, Peiping will probably continue to rest its hopes not on the development of Communist parties but on militantly radical regimes which welcome Chinese assistance and accept a considerable Chinese presence.

7. Peiping appears to divide African nations into four general categories and tailors its program to fit the Chinese conception of the situation and circumstances which apply in each case. The first group, composed of the radical states with which close cooperation is possible, include Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville). The Chinese maintain cordial ties with the leaders of these countries and work closely with them to maintain bases for operations against third countries.

8. The second category of states includes those which have recently become independent and where the political orientation of the government is still in the process of development. Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania fall in this group, which Peiping is attempting to steer toward the left. The Chinese have offered generous economic aid programs to these countries and have sent military assistance to Tanzania.

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9. A third category consists of "conservative" states, vulnerable to revolutionary efforts in the long run, but not lucrative targets for active subversion at the present time. Tunisia, Morocco, and Ethiopia are included in this group. Peiping has diplomatic relations with Tunisia and Morocco and has made periodic overtures for an exchange of diplomatic missions with Addis Ababa.

10. The final category is composed of "reactionary" regimes--that is, those which do not recognize Peiping and have been resisting Chinese Communist blandishments. Included in this group are Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Gabon, Congo (Leopoldville) and Rwanda. All are targets for active subversion at the present time. Other "conservative" governments--Liberia, Ivory Coast, Malawi, and the Malagasy Republic--appear to be on the Chinese list for future attention.

11. Peiping now maintains diplomatic ties with 16 African nations. Seven countries established diplomatic relations in 1964, including Kenya, Congo (Brazzaville), Tunisia, Central African Republic, Zambia, and Dahomey. More gains are in prospect. Many moderate African governments, however, including Cameroon, Niger, Upper Volta, and the Ivory Coast, are genuinely suspicious of the Chinese Communists and their potential for subversion and are not anxious to see them established locally. Burundi established relations in 1964, but suspended relations in January 1965, accusing the Chinese of subversive activities.

12. Chinese Communist posts abroad serve as major propaganda outlets. Chinese diplomats and press representatives throughout Africa, as well as Chou En-lai and other lesser figures touring the continent, assiduously echo the line that Peiping is Africa's best friend, overflowing with understanding of African problems and sharing a common experience of foreign exploitation.

13. The Chinese now beam more than 100 hours of radio propaganda to Africa each week, as compared with about 50 hours three years ago. Languages include English, French, Arabic, Cantonese, Portuguese, Swahili, and Hausa. The Cantonese-language broadcasts

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are directed toward the more than 40,000 overseas Chinese in East Africa, about half of whom inhabit Mauritius, a tiny British island in the Indian Ocean.

14. High-quality pamphlets and periodicals in both English and French are widely distributed in Africa. The New China News Agency (NCNA), Peiping's principal agency for dissemination of propaganda, now maintains offices in 15 African countries, and also has numerous effective and often influential local stringers. Tanzanian Minister Babu formerly served as an NCNA representative in East Africa.

15. Since Peiping is unable to afford economic and technical assistance programs on the same scale as those offered by the West and by the Soviet Union, it relies heavily on the propaganda effect of its more modest efforts. Communist China has made offers of economic assistance amounting to a total of about \$335 million. Agreements negotiated last year alone came to approximately \$195 million. As in other parts of the world, however, Chinese economic assistance to Africa has remained largely a paper proposition. Only about one fourth of the funds have been obligated thus far and less than 10 percent--about \$20 million--have been drawn. There are over 1,500 Chinese technicians and laborers in Africa and this figure is likely to increase substantially in the future.

16. The Chinese aid programs have stressed assistance for agricultural development and the establishment of small-scale industries for food processing and consumer goods. Chinese schemes to grow sugar, rice, and tea in Mali apparently are working out well and several hundred Chinese technicians continue to be employed on these projects. In Ghana, Chinese technicians are providing assistance in growing swamp rice and other groups are to initiate similar projects for the production of vegetables, cotton, and peanuts.

17. Total Chinese trade with Africa has been small, amounting to approximately \$120 million in 1963, but is growing. During the first half of 1964 total

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Chinese trade with Africa was 50 percent larger than that in the comparable period of the previous year.

Congo (Brazzaville)

18. The Chinese consider Brazzaville one of their major bases of operation in Africa and have had considerable success in cultivating the Brazzaville regime. Brazzaville's dominant leaders have come to regard Peiping as their principal foreign benefactor; extreme leftists who preach revolution for revolution's sake and favor Chinese Communist models have been in the ascendancy.

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21. Since last July the Chinese have agreed to provide, interest free, \$25 million in cash and in commodity credits. This is an impressive amount for a country with an annual budget of approximately \$40 million. The Chinese have also granted an unspecified number of scholarships to train pilots, engineers, and "others."

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Mali

22. Peiping already has a substantial presence in Mali, with major leaders of Mali's Marxist-oriented regime viewing Chinese aid and example as particularly suited to their country's needs.

23. High-level contacts between Mali and Communist China reached a new peak during 1964. They began with a visit to Bamako by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi. Mali President Keita visited Communist China last fall, and in speeches in Asian capitals supported Chinese propaganda positions on virtually every international issue. He saw, with the Chinese, "an excellent revolutionary situation," existing all over Africa, expressed gratitude for China's "disinterested" aid, and warmly congratulated the Chinese for having recently "put an end to the monopoly and atomic blackmail of imperialism."

24. Before Keita's visit, Peiping had offered long-term, no-interest credits amounting to \$19.6 million, considerably less than half the \$55 million committed by Moscow in 1961 and 1962.

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Under existing agreements, there are

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
already about 700 Chinese in Mali, many of whom are engaged in rice and tea cultivation.

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Ghana

29. The Chinese consider Ghana a base country for exporting "revolution" to West and Central Africa.



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30. Chinese economic aid commitments have totaled over \$40 million since 1961.



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Algeria

32. The CPR maintains cordial ties with the nationalist, radical-leaning government of Ben Bella and regards Algeria as a key country in supporting revolution in North Africa. The Chinese have been assiduous in cultivating the Algerians in 1965, one reason being the upcoming second Afro-Asian conference to be held in Algiers in June.



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The Chinese expect to use this conference as a forum for consolidating their position as the leaders of the "emerging forces" of the world.

33. There are indications, however, that some Algerian leaders are concerned about the tactics the Chinese will use at the June conference in view of the apparently intransigent positions the Chinese hold toward the US and the USSR. The disruptive tactics of the Chinese at other international gatherings has heightened Algerian concern. A good example is the anti-Soviet polemic conducted by the Chinese at the International Teachers Conference held in Algiers in April.

34. Both Chou En-lai and Chen Yi visited Algiers during their ten-country swing through Africa in the winter of 1963-64, and Chou has just concluded another visit to Algiers. Both Chou and Chen are scheduled to attend the June conference.

35. The Chinese supplied approximately \$15 million, beginning in 1959, to support Algerian nationalist military activity. Chinese assistance has continued since Algerian independence in 1962 and has included a \$50-million, interest-free loan made under a 1963 agreement on economic and technical cooperation. The Chinese also signed a three-year cultural agreement in 1963. The Chinese gave a 13,000-ton freighter in February 1965--a gift which left the Chinese merchant fleet with only 12 ships actively engaged in international trade.

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Tanzania

36. The Chinese maintain close relations with the Tanzanian Government, providing economic and military aid, and have particularly close contact with the more radical members of the government.

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Tanzania and Communist China have some goals in common, including support of the Congolese and Mozambique rebels.

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38. Dar es Salaam has been a center of Chinese activity in East Africa since the arrival of NCNA representative Kao Liang in December 1961. It is the center of financial assistance for radical African movements and even for some arms assistance to them. It is the operations center for the largest Chinese presence in East Africa with over 50 persons assigned to the embassy, plus some 90 economic technicians. Dar is used as a jumping-off point for Africans from this area who are invited to China.

39. The Chinese have played a significant role in Zanzibar since the January 1964 coup. They have backed a number of Zanzibar extremists, including Tanzanian Minister Babu, in an effort to gain a firm foothold on the East African mainland.

40. In June 1964 agreements were signed which provided \$42 million in economic development credits and a \$3-million grant. There was also provision for military assistance. Following this, several Chinese technical, economic, cultural, and agricultural missions arrived.

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41. The Chinese recognize the UAR as the key to greater influence in the Arab world and hope to use Nasir's friendship to advance their campaign for greater influence in the area. Peiping wishes to benefit from current US-UAR difficulties resulting from US objections to Egyptian assistance for the Congo rebels. The Chinese have also backed the UAR and the rest of the Arab world in their confrontation with Israel.

42. Peiping in December 1964 agreed to extend an interest-free loan of \$80 million to cover the cost of Chinese goods and services supplied to the UAR during the next three years. A Sino-Egyptian agreement on scientific and technological cooperation, signed in January 1965, was an extension of the cultural cooperation protocol first signed in 1956.

43. Despite their acceptance of Chinese aid, some high Egyptian officials, including Prime Minister Ali Sabri, have apparently made realistic assessments of Chinese foreign policy goals. Ali Sabri stated privately in late March that he was well aware that the Middle East was bound to be a strategic objective for the Chinese in their drive to dominate Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Kenya

44. The Kenyan Government of Jomo Kenyatta has adopted a wary approach toward the Chinese Communists. The Chinese themselves are operating with caution in Kenya, apparently not wishing to jeopardize what they probably regard as excellent opportunities for long-term gains. The Chinese have wooed Oginga Odinga, Kenya's radical and influential vice president, who has a personal following second only to that of Kenyatta.

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45. The Chinese maintain good relations with Guinea's radical leaders. Though the Chinese maintain their largest embassy staff in West Africa (nearly 50 people) in Conakry, they have placed less stress in recent years on Guinea than on other radical states such as Mali, Congo (Brazzaville) and Ghana. This is partly because of a more cautious foreign policy line followed by President Touré who has adopted a calculated policy of trying to get more aid from the US.

46. The Chinese have extended more than \$26 million in credits. No new assistance was provided in 1964, but an increasing number of Chinese technicians arrived, primarily for work on the Kinkon dam. [REDACTED]

more than 700 Chinese, including an unspecified number of laborers, may now be working on the dam.

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Dahomey

47. Dahomey is another of the French-speaking states that has edged gradually away from Taiwan. Dahomey recognized Peiping as the "sole legal government" of China and established diplomatic relations in November. The Chinese Nationalist mission was ordered on 25 March to leave the country.

48. Peiping's offers of economic assistance were probably instrumental in Dahomey's decision to expel the Chinese Nationalist diplomats. Peiping has offered Dahomey a credit of \$20 million, but final arrangements apparently have not been worked out. The Dahomey minister of finance in early April confirmed numerous rumors of Chinese aid offers and stated that 80 percent of the credit would be in the form of "material" and the rest devoted to assistance for mutually agreed projects.

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50. Somalia apparently has low priority in Peiping's plans for Africa, and Chinese activity there is limited. The Chinese in August 1963 extended an \$18.6-million economic development credit, plus a \$3-million budgetary support grant. The Somalis attempted to get the budgetary grant renewed in 1964, but were unsuccessful.

Morocco

51. Though Morocco was the second country in Africa to establish relations (in 1958) with Communist China, Chinese-Moroccan relations remain limited. The only Chinese Communists in Morocco are embassy personnel. The Chinese have not extended any economic assistance to Morocco.

Central African Republic

52. Diplomatic relations were established only in September 1964 and Chinese activities are still limited. A \$4-million loan agreement was signed in January, one half to be in cash and one half in commodities. An NCNA office is scheduled to be established this year and the Chinese are currently engaged in preparing the way for a relatively large representation.

Ethiopia

54. The Ethiopian Government so far has put off Chinese approaches for establishment of diplo-

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matic relations. Chinese assistance to Somalia has been a complicating factor. A joint communiqué at the conclusion of Chou En-lai's visit in January 1964 announced that relations would soon be "normalized." Chen Yi reportedly stated in early 1964 that Ethiopia had definitely agreed to recognize Communist China, but no date was set.

Senegal

55. Senegal does not have relations with either Peiping or Taipei.

[redacted] believes the Chinese are supporting subversive elements in Senegal and are a "menace" to the government. There is evidence that one faction of Senegal's African Independence Party, an illegal Communist party, has close ties with Communist China. Some important elements within the government also favor an exchange of missions with Peiping.

Cameroon

56. The arrest of a group of Chinese-trained guerrilla fighters in 1960 soured relations between the two countries for several years and it was not until 1964 that President Ahidjo's government appeared to be more receptive to Chinese approaches. It did receive a touring Chinese "good-will" delegation last fall and agreed to return the gesture at some future date. However, Ahidjo reportedly was not satisfied with the result of his "frank" talks with the delegation about Peiping's links with Cameroonian dissidents. Since the visit his attitude toward Communist China seems to have hardened. There are elements in the government, however, which favor closer relations with Peiping.

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Burundi

58. The Burundi Government temporarily suspended relations with Communist China in late January, expelling all Chinese diplomats. The CPR was charged with

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carrying on subversive activities in Burundi. The political situation in Burundi is highly unstable, however, and there are elements in the government which are anxious to have diplomatic relations re-established with the CPR.

Sudan

59. Sudan was one of the first countries in Africa to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists. Sudanese relations with the Chinese during the Abboud regime were correct but cool. The more radical quality of the present government may give the Chinese more room to maneuver. The Sudan Communist Party has a small pro-Chinese wing, but the party is dominated by pro-Soviet elements.

South Africa

60. The Chinese have maintained an extremely hostile attitude toward the South African Government and Peiping supports the rebel Pan Africanist Congress. Though the PAC is non-Communist, the Chinese have been able to use the racial issue, along with monetary assistance, to gain considerable influence in the movement. The Chinese have little influence in the Soviet-dominated South Africa Communist Party.

61. Although the Chinese have denied that they trade with South Africa, this trade in 1963 amounted to over \$8 million.

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SECRETChinese Communist Diplomatic Relations with African CountriesDiplomatic Relations Established

Algeria	3 July 1962
Central African Republic	29 September 1964
Congo (Brazzaville)	22 February 1964
Dahomey	12 November 1964
Ghana	5 July 1960
Guinea	4 October 1959
Kenya	21 January 1964
Mali	27 October 1960
Mauritania	19 July 1965
Morocco	1 November 1958
Somalia	16 December 1960
Sudan	1 December 1958
Tanzania	9 December 1961
Tunisia	20 April 1964
Uganda	18 October 1962
United Arab Republic	30 May 1956
Zambia	30 October 1964

Relations were established with Burundi on 14 January 1964, but were suspended by the Burundi Government on 29 January 1965.

Those countries maintaining relations with the GRC are: Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Leopoldville), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Upper Volta.

NCNA offices are maintained in all countries the CPR has relations with except in Uganda, Dahomey, and Central African Republic. Offices are also maintained in Senegal and Ethiopia.

NCNA office opened in Bangor, AR, 27 or 28 June 65.
 NCNA Rep in Kenya killed on 22 July 65.

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~~SECRET~~CPR Trade with Africa, 1963, Jan-Jun 1964 in Millions US\$

	<u>Exports</u>		<u>Imports</u>	
	<u>1963</u>	<u>Jan-Jun 64</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>Jan-Jun 64</u>
Angola				.2
Cameroon	.2	NA		
Congo (Leopoldville)			.6	
Ethiopia	1.6	0.9		
Ghana	2.1	0.8	.5	2.8
Guinea	4.1	NA	.9	
Ivory Coast		0.2		
Kenya	.3	.7	1.0	.6
Mali	1.2	1.3		
Morocco	6.8	8.6	6.2	5.9
Nigeria	4.4	3.8	1.0	.5
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	.2	NA	1.1	NA
Senegal	2.3	NA		
Sierra Leone	.3	.2		
South Africa	2.6	NA	6.0	NA
Sudan	4.3	2.5	12.5	.1
Tanganyika	.3	.3	10.4	1.4
Togo	.3	.3		
Tunisia	.9			.4
Uganda	.9	.3	11.2	2.7
United Arab Republic	<u>19.9</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>19.7</u>
Total	52.7	28.8	67.8	34.3

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